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above-referenced case. The reversal that Lopes seems to require
would also render Point V of the brief moot. I have attached a
copy of the opinion to this letter.
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Attorneys:

Jan Graham, Att'y Gen., Salt Lake City,
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Linda M. Jones, Michael A. Peterson,
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ZIMMERMAN^ Justice:
11
Cameron Thomas Lopes appeals from a judgment and
conviction for murder, a first degree felony, and enhanced
sentences imposed by the district court pursuant to sections 7 63-203(1) and -203.1 of the Utah Code. Lopes asks this court to
reverse the group criminal activity enhancement on the basis that
section 76-3-203.1 violates both the federal and Utah
constitutions. We hold that the application of section 7 6-3203.1 in this case did deprive Lopes of certain fundamental
constitutional rights. Furthermore, we hold subsection (5)(c) of
section 76-3-203.1 violates the Utah Constitution. We,
therefore, reverse and remand for a new trial.
12
In March of 1996, the State charged Lopes and several
other individuals with murder, a first degree felony, in
violation of section 7 6-5-203 of the Utah Code. The information
alleged that early in the morning of February 22, 1996, Lopes,
along with three other persons who were parties to the offense,
went to the residence of Jimmy DeHerrera with the intent to kill
the occupants. One of the defendants fired two shots from a .20
gauge shotgun into an open window. Both shots hit and killed
Joey Miera, who was asleep on the floor. The information further

alleged that the defendants shot Miera in retaliation for another
shooting one week earlier that killed one of the defendants'
friends. The information also gave notice to Lopes that he was
subject to enhanced penalties for the use of a firearm, pursuant
to Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203(1) (Supp. 1998) ("firearm
enhancement"), and for having acted in concert with two or more
persons, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1 (1995) ("group
criminal activity" or "gang" enhancement) -1 Lopes waived his
preliminary hearing and agreed to be bound over to the district
court.
13
In the district court, Lopes moved to strike the gang
enhancement as unconstitutional under both the state and federal
constitutions. The court denied^his motion. Thereafter, he
pleaded guilty to the homicide offense, with enhancements, in
exchange for dismissal of charges pending against him in another
case. Lopes conditioned his plea pursuant to State v. SerV/ 758
P.2d 935 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).2 Lopes's conditional plea
preserved his right to challenge the constitutionality of the
gang enhancement statute.
14
Thereafter, the trial court issued findings that Lopes
was subject to an enhanced penalty under section 7 6-3-203.1 and
entered judgment against him.3 The trial court sentenced Lopes

1

Lopes refers to section 76-3-203.1 as the "gang"
enhancement statute. The State correctly points out in its brief
that the legislature did not create a "gang" enhancement,
although the statute is popularly known by that name. We agree
with the State that referring to the statute as a "group criminal
activity" enhancement is more accurate than "gang" enhancement.
Nevertheless, we have previously referred to the statute under
its commonly known name, see State v. Alvarez, 872 P.2d 450, 461
(Utah 1994), and we will continue to do so for ease of reference.
2

The Serv decision, which this court has endorsed, see
State v. Rivera, 943 P.2d 1344, 1344-45 (Utah 1997); Utah R.
Crim. P. 11(i), permits a criminal defendant to plead guilty
while preserving issues for appeal. In this case, Lopes
specifically preserved his right to appeal the constitutionality
of the gang enhancement statute.
3

Lopes objected to the first paragraph of the judge's
findings and conclusions regarding applicability of the gang
enhancement statute because the judge had suggested that the
issue was waived. As first written, that paragraph stated:
(Continued on next page.)
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to an indeterminate term of five years to life* The court also
enhanced the sentence under the gang enhancement statute,
sentencing Lopes to an additional four years to "run
consecutively and not concurrently with the basic sentence."
Lopes appeals that order*
55
Lopes contends that the gang enhancement statute
creates a separate criminal offense by combining a separate
mental element—"in concert"—with a criminal act and, therefore,
for the statute to satisfy state and federal due process
concerns, the State must prove the elements of the enhancement
beyond a reasonable doubt, as with any other crime. He also
asserts that section 76-3-203.1(5)(c) interferes with his right
to a jury trial, as guaranteed by article I, section 12 of the
Utah Constitution.4

3

(Footnote continued.)
In his Statement of Defendant [sic] executed in
connection with his entry of guilty plea and in his
colloquy with the court, the defendant, although
challenging its constitutionality, acknowledged the
applicability of the gang enhancement as pleaded by the
state.
After objection, the first paragraph was changed to read:
Defendant admitted that he went with at least two other
people to Joey Miera's home for the purpose of
retaliating for a fellow gang member's shooting, and
with the stated purpose of "[gett]ing the punks."
By making this modification, the trial court acknowledged
that Lopes never conceded that all the elements of the
enhancement statute were satisfied, i.e., that the other
individuals shared the requisite mental state for murder. This
means that the issue of the applicable burden of proof is
squarely before us today. See infra 19.
4

Lopes raises a series of other claims. He argues that
the statute interferes with his fundamental due process rights
because it denies him his right to a preliminary hearing, which
article I, section 13 of the Utah Constitution guarantees. In
the alternative, he argues that the statute identifies additional
elements of the underlying offense that the State must prove
beyond a reasonable doubt to the same trier of fact who decided
guilt on the predicate crime. And finally, Lopes argues on
appeal that the statute violates the federal Due Process Clause
(Continued on next page.)
3
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A constitutional challenge to a statute presents a
question of law, which we review for correctness. See State v.
Mohi, 901 P.2d 991, 995 (Utah 1995). When addressing such a
challenge, this court presumes that the statute is valid, and we
resolve any reasonable doubts in favor of constitutionality. See
Society of Separationists, Inc. v. Whitehead, 870 P.2d 916, 920
(Utah 1993); Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Garfield County,
811 P.2d 184, 187 (Utah 1991).
17
In response to Lopes's argument that in enacting the
gang enhancement statute, the legislature created a new crime,
the State notes that the legislature specifically expressed an
intent that the gang enhancement not be a separate offense. The
legislature does have broad authority to define crimes and
prescribe punishments. See State v. Bishop, 717 P.2d 261, 263-64
(Utah 1986); State v. Angus, 581 P.2d 992, 994-95 (Utah 1978).
However, although the legislature specifically stated in the
statute that it intended section 76-3-203.1 to be an enhancement,
this is not dispositive as to what the legislature actually did.
18

The gang enhancement statute provides in part:
(1) (a) A person who commits any offense
listed in Subsection (4) in concert with two
or more persons is subject to an enhanced
penalty for the offense as provided below.
(b) "In concert with two or more
persons" as used in this section means the
defendant and two or more other persons would
be criminally liable for the offense as
parties under Section 76-2-202.

Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1 (1) (a) & (b) (1995) (emphasis added).
Section 76-2-202, referred to in section 76-3-203.1(1) (b), states
that a person who acts "with the mental state required for the
commission of an offense," and either "directly commits the
offense, [or] solicits, requests, commands, encourages, or
intentionally aids another person to engage in conduct which

4

(Footnote continued.)
because it is vague and overly broad and that it violates the
Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution and the
uniform operation of laws provision of the Utah Constitution.
Because we decide this case based on the fundamental rights
arguments in the text, we do not need to address these additional
constitutional challenges.
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constitutes an offense shall be criminally liable as a party for
such conduct." Id. § 7 6-2-202. In summary, section 7 6-3203.1(1) (a) requires that all three actors must (i) have
possessed a mental state sufficient to commit the same underlying
offense and (ii) have directly committed the underlying offense
or solicited, requested, commanded, encouraged, or intentionally
aided one of the other two actors to engage in conduct
constituting the underlying offense. At a minimum, under the
statute, the State must prove that all three actors are guilty of
":iding and abetting." This was the effective holding of our
decisions in State v. Labrum, 925 P.2d 937 (Utah 1996) ("Labrum
I") and State v. Alvarez, 872 P.2d 450 (Utah 1994). In Labrum I,
we made it clear that "in concert" under the gang enhancement
statute means that the defendant acted with at least two other
people and "that those other persons must also be liable for the
underlying offense." Id. at 940; see also California v. Zermeno,
61 Cal. App. 4th 623, 628 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998) (holding that
statute imposing enhanced sentence upon showing of "pattern of
criminal gang activity" required State to show beyond a
reasonable doubt that at least one^ other actor was guilty of
"aiding and abetting" defendant).
59
This leads us to the burden of proof issue. In Labrum
1/ we did not address the burden of proof by which the State must
prove the "in concert" element of the gang enhancement statute,
but the court of appeals did address that question in a
subsequent appeal. In Labrum I, we stated that before imposing
the gang enhancement, the statute required "the sentencing judge
[-c] make discrete . . . findings" that are "indispensable to the
gang enhancement statute because they establish the legal basis
that justifies imposition of the prescribed penalty." Labrum 1/
925 P.2d at 940. We remanded Labrum I for further proceedings
because "no specific finding was entered with respect to the
complicity of the other two persons who accompanied Labrum." Id.
a": 941. On remand, the trial court made factual findings
regarding the other two actors' participation and then enhanced
Labrum's sentence. See State v. Labrum, 959 P.2d 120, 121 (Utah
Ct. App. 1998) ("Labrum II"). Labrum again appealed.
510 Before the court of appeals, Labrum argued that the
sentencing court's findings were legally insufficient to fix
accomplice liability. Labrum premised his argument on both the
language of the statute and due process. The court of appeals
reversed the enhancement on grounds that the findings were
insufficient. It did not address the constitutional question;
instead, it held:
Under this statute, it is not enough that
others were present when the crime was
committed. Rather, the quality of their
5
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involvement must rise to the level of
participation described in section 76-2-202,
•

• •

Id. at 124. The court of appeals then went on to say that all
three actors "must possess a sufficiently culpable mental state,
and the prosecution must prove the foregoing beyond a reasonable
doubt." Id. (emphasis added). Because the court of appeals
appeared to rely on statutory interpretation to fix the burden of
proof, it had no occasion to address Labrum's constitutional
challenges.5
511 Today, Lopes presents to this court a challenge to the
gang enhancement statute that is essentially identical to the one
passed upon by the court of appeals in Labrum II. He contends
that the State must prove all the elements of accomplice
liability, including the mental state, beyond a reasonable doubt.
We agree with Lopes and conclude that the statutory "enhancement"
requires proof of the other actors' criminal culpability, and
that the State must prove their criminal culpability beyond a
reasonable doubt. This conclusion finds support in our decision
in State v. Angus, 581 P.2d 992 (Utah 1978).
112 In Angus, the defendant was charged with aggravated
assault, and the State sought a firearm enhancement. The
defendant argued that the firearm enhancement statute created a
separate offense that the State had to plead as a separate crime,
not as an enhancement. This court disagreed. See id. at 994.
In rejecting the claim of a separate crime that had to be
separately charged, we said: "When the matter is looked at
correctly and realistically, it is seen that there is but one
criminal act charged, but describing it accurately brings it
within the higher penalty prescribed by law: to-wit, an
aggravated assault which was committed with a firearm." Id. at
994 (footnote omitted). Angus acknowledged that the legislature
has the prerogative "to prescribe the punishment for crimes'7 and
thereby may "increase the degree of crime." Id. We said that
the legislature, by enacting the firearm enhancement, had
increased the degree of the crime by establishing a separate set
of elements that, if proven, warranted a higher punishment.
Importantly for present purposes, we concluded in Angus that
while the State did not need to separately charge the enhancement
as a crime, it did need to prove each element, including the
defendant's use of a firearm, beyond a reasonable doubt because
5

The court of appeals decided Labrum II after oral
argument in the present case. Pursuant to rule 24(h) of the Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure, Lopes notified this court of the
Labrum II decision.
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firearm. See id. at 995.
5:j Returning to the present case, as both a state and
federal constitutional matter, we conclude that due process
requires that the prosecution prove every element of the charged
crimes beyond a reasonable doubt. See Utah Const, art. I, § 7;
U.S. Const, amend. V, XIV; see also State v. Herrera/ 8 95 P.2d
359, 368 (Utah 1995}("due process mandates that the prosecution
prove every element of the charged crimes beyond a reasonable
doubt."); State v. Swenson, 838 P.2d 1136, 1138 (Utah 1992)
(holding that State has burden of proving all elements of a
crime) : State v. Starks, 627 P.2d 88, 92 (Utah 1981) P A
fundamental precept of our criminal law is that the state must
prove all elements of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt.").
114 Furthermore, and independently, as a statutory matter,
the Code requires that the State prove each element of the
charged crime beyond a reasonable doubt. See Utah Code Ann. §
7 6-1-501 (1995) (requiring that each "element of the offense
charged" be "proved beyond a reasonable doubt," including "[t]he
conduct, attendant circumstances," and "[tjhe culpable mental
state required.").
115 When the legislature passed the gang enhancement
provision, it acted just as it did when it passed the firearm
enhancement provision: it mandated imposition of an enhancement
only upon proof of elements over and above those required for the
crime of lesser consequence. In essence, it created a specific
new crime or a crime of a higher degree. As such, each of the
elements must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Here, they
were not. Therefore, we find the trial court's imposition of the
gang enhancement to have been in error.
116 Finally, we turn to Lopes's assertion that the gang
enhancement statute interferes with his right to a jury trial.
He argues that since the statute creates a separate and new
offense, each element must be found beyond a reasonable doubt by
a jury, not the trial judge. We agree. The Utah Constitution
provides "[i]n criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the
right
to have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury."
Utah Const, art. I, § 12. In criminal jury trials, questions of
fact and the weight of evidence are to be decided by the jury,
absent waiver. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-10 (1995); State v.
Green, 78 Utah 580, 589-90, 6 P.2d 177, 181 (1931) ("It is the
sole and exclusive province of the jury to determine the facts in
all criminal cases, whether the evidence offered by the state is
weak or strong, is in conflict or is not controverted./')
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517 The gang enhancement statute, section 76-3203.1(5)(c), provides:
(c) The sentencing judge rather than the jury
shall decide whether to impose the enhanced
penalty under this section. The imposition of the
penalty is contingent upon a finding by the
sentencing judge that this section is applicable.
In conjunction with sentencing the court shall
enter written findings of fact concerning the
applicability of this section.
This section of the enhancement statute directs the judge to
become the fact finder, expressly taking that power away from the
jury. In this case, the judge followed the statute and became
the fact finder. Even though Lopes pled guilty to the underlying
offense, his plea did not establish the requisite mental state of
the other actors, as is necessary to support imposition of the
gang enhancement. His plea, then, • did not establish all of the
elements of the enhancement offense beyond a reasonable doubt.
The trial judge supplemented the plea by making the factual
finding that the elements of the gang enhancement were
established, and implemented the enhancement. This clearly
violated article I, section 12 of the Utah Constitution because,
absent waiver, only a jury has the ability to determine when
elements of a crime are established beyond a reasonable doubt.
Therefore, we find subsection (5)(c) of § 76-3-203.1 of the Code
unconstitutional.
118 Having held subsection (5)(c) unconstitutional, we now
determine if the remainder of the gang enhancement statute can
remain in effect. The general rule is "that statutes, where
possible, are to be construed so as to sustain their
constitutionality. Accordingly, if a portion of the statute
might be saved by severing the part that is unconstitutional,
such should be done." Celebrity Club Inc. v. Utah Liquor Control
Comm'n, 657 P.2d 1293, 1299 (Utah 1982). This basic rule applies
to criminal and civil statutes equally. See State v. Nielsen/ 19
Utah 2d 66, 69, 426 P.2d 13, 15 (1967) (court severed
unconstitutional section of criminal statute); State v. Green,
793 P.2d 912, 917 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (holding that basic rule
[of severing unconstitutional provision] applies to the
construction of criminal statutes).
119 To determine if a statute is severable from its
unconstitutional subsection, we look to legislative intent. If
the intent is not expressly stated, we then turn to the statute
itself, and examine the remaining constitutional portion of the
statute in relation to the stricken portion. If the remainder of
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the statute is operable and still furthers the intended
legislative purpose, the statute will be allowed to stand.
Union Trust

Co. v.

Simmons, 116 Utah

422,

423,

211 P.2d

See

190,

193

(1949), quoted in Stewart v. Utah Pub, Serv. Comm'n, 885 P.2d
759, 779-80 (Utah 1994) .
120 The criminal code contains a separability clause, but
it does not aid us in this situation.6 Furthermore, since there
is no express intent on the severability question in the gang
enhancement statute, we examine the statute itself to determine
if severing section 76-3-203.1(5)(c) will destroy the purpose of
the statute. A close reading of 76-3-203.1 indicates that
severing subsection (5)(c) will not make the objective of the
statute unconstitutional.7 The statute imposes higher penalties
if a person commits certain offenses "in concert with two or more
persons." Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1(1) (1995). It makes no
difference in the application of the statute or the satisfaction
of its purposes if the trial judge is the fact finder or if the
questions of fact are left to the jury. We therefore find the
remaining portion of the gang enhancement statute constitutional.
S21 We address the proper course of further proceedings in
this case.
We reverse and remand for a new trial on the gang
enhancement charge. Our remand does not place the defendant in
double jeopardy, because the failure to prove an essential
element of the gang enhancement charge was "trial error." See

6

Section 76-1-108 states: "If any provision of this act,
or.the application of any provision to any person or
circumstance, is held invalid, the remainder of this act shall
not be affected thereby.'7 Although we have never interpreted
this provision in the past, we now find that the only purpose of
this section is to preserve the entire criminal code in case any
one provision is declared unconstitutional. On its face, it does
not give any direction in this circumstance, where we are trying
to determine the severability of one subsection from a larger
section.
7

Section

76-3-203.2

of

the

Utah Code, which

imposes

enhanced penalties for the use of dangerous weapons in offenses
committed on school premises, is almost identical in structure to
the gang enhancement statute. A key difference is that section
7 6-3-203.2 does not include a section making the judge the fact
finder in a particular case. It seems clear that holding
subsection (5)(c) of the gang enhancement statute invalid as
unconstitutional will not frustrate the legislative purpose of
the statute, as section 76-3-203.2 operates without making the
trial judge the fact finder.
9
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State v. Hiqqenbotham, 917 P.2d 545, 550-51 (Utah 1996) (decision
was reversed and remanded due to failure to prove an essential
element of the charge). It was not the fault of the prosecution
that all elements of the gang enhancement statute were not
satisfied. Until this decision, no one had notice that the
enhancement statute requires proof#of all elements beyond a
reasonable doubt, or that this determination could not be made by
a judge absent a waiver of the right to a jury trial. Therefore,
the State should not be denied the right to a fair adjudication
because of double jeopardy. See State v. Lamorie, 610 P.2d 342,
347 (Utah 1980) (xxThe state and the accused share the right to a
fair, error-free determination of the guilt or innocence of the
accused, and the double jeopardy clause may not deny either side
that right.").
522 We hold that the gang enhancement statute creates a new
and separate offense and, therefore, the Code requires each
element of this crime be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Since
the elements of the crime were not established against Lopes,
either by his plea or by a jury trial, he was deprived of his due
process- rights as guaranteed by the federal and Utah
constitutions. Furthermore, subsection (5)(c) of Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-3-203.1 is found to violate a^defendant's right to a jury
trial as established in the Constitution of the State of Utah.
We reverse and remand for a new trial on the section 7 6-3-203.1
charge.

123 Associate Chief Justice Durham and Justice Stewart
concur in Justice Zimmerman7s opinion.

RUSSON, Justice/ dissenting:
524 I dissent. In my opinion, the gang enhancement statute
is simply a sentencing statute. It does not create a separate
offense with a separate penalty, nor does it add elements to the
underlying offense. Rather, it merely enhances the minimum
sentence for the underlying offense once the accused has been
found guilty of that offense; the maximum sentence remains the
same regardless of whether the enhancement applies. In fact, the
statute specifically states, "This section does not create any
separate offense but provides an enhanced penalty for the primary
offense." Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1(5)(a) (1995).
125 As a general principle, the legislature has broad
authority to define crimes and corresponding punishments, and its
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decision in this regard should not be proscribed unless it
offends some fundamental principle of justice. See McMillan v.
Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 73, 85-86 (1986); see also State v. Angus,
581 P.2d 992, 994-95 (Utah 1978) ("It is the prerogative of the
legislature to prescribe the punishment for crimes.") . With
respect to Utah's firearm and gang enhancement statutes, this
court has recognized and upheld the legislature's authority to
require a trial judge to enhance a defendant's statutory minimum
sentence if certain requirements are met during the sentencing
phase. Seer e.g.. State v. Alvarez, 872 E , -'el 450, 461 (Utah
1994) (affirming trial court's imposition of enhanced minimum
sentence under section 76-3-203.1 upon court's finding that
defendant committed underlying offense "in concert" with others);
State v. Deli, 861 P.2d 431, 434-35 (Utah 1993) (affirming trial
court's imposition of enhanced minimum sentence under section
76-3-203 for use of firearm during commission of offense); Angus,
581 P.2d at 995 (same).
12 6 Notably, wxth respect to the tirearm ennancement
statute, we have consistently held that the statute does not
create a separate, additional penalty for the underlying offense;
it merely "enhances" the minimum sentence. For example, in
Angus, after the defendant had been convicted of aggravated
assault, the trial court imposed an enhanced minimum sentence
pursuant to the firearm enhancement statute. See 581 P.2d at
993. Rejecting the defendant's argument that the statute created
a separate offense which must be charged separately, we stated:
The punishment for a crime is not and has
never been considered a part of the pleading
charging a crime.
After conviction
the penalty to be imposed is an entirely
separate proposition to be determined by the
court as a matter of law. on the basis of the
penalty prescribed by the statutes,
Angus, 581 P.2d at 995.
1^/ More recently, in Deli, we affirmed a firearm
enhancement imposed after the defendant was convicted of a number
of crimes, including murder. Once again, we emphasized that the
enhancement penalties of the firearm enhancement statute are not
separate sentences; instead, "the legislature intended the
penalty for using a firearm in the commission of a felony to
simply *increaser or ^enhance' the original sentence imposed, net
to stand alone as a separate sentence." Deli/ 861 P.2d at 434.
528 In Alvarez, we upheld an enhanced penalty imposed
pursuant to the gang enhancement statute, see 872 P,2d at 461-t)w*

ii
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however, in that case we did not address whether section
76-3-203.1 creates a separate offense with a separate penalty- I
would hold that it does not. Before a defendant is subject to an
enhanced penalty under either the firearm or the gang enhancement
statute, the defendant first must be convicted of an underlying
offense.1 Thereafter, the sentencing judge must impose an
"indeterminate" sentence prescribed by statute.2 While the judge
ordinarily has the power to suspend the defendant's sentence,3
under the firearm and gang enhancement statutes the judge must
enhance the minimum sentence for the underlying offense if
certain requirements are met. Thus, the gang enhancement statute
operates in exactly the same manner as the firearm enhancement
statute—that is, it merely increases the minimum sentence which
the legislature has prescribed for the underlying offense. It
does not affect the maximum sentence.
229 The majority opinion holds that the "in concert"
requirement defined in section 76-3-203.1 creates a separate
offense because it combines a separate mens rea—i.e., "in
concert" mental culpability—with a criminal act. This reasoning
is flawed. While a defendant may be charged with a crime and
held accountable as an accomplice under section 76-2-202,4 the

1

The underlying offenses are enumerated in Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-3-203.1(4) and include crimes such as murder, rape,
kidnapping and robbery.
2

Under Utah's indeterminate sentencing scheme, the
sentencing judge must impose a sentence and judgment of
imprisonment for an indeterminate term "of not less than the
minimum and not to exceed the maximum term provided by law for
the particular crime." Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-4(2). Unless
otherwise expressly provided by law, every sentence "shall
continue until the maximum period has been reached unless sooner
terminated or commuted by authority of the Board of Pardons and
Parole." Id. § 77-18-4(3); see also Padilla v. Board of Pardons,
947 P.2d 664, 669 (Utah 1997) ("By its very term, the
x
indeterminate' sentence shall continue until the maximum period
expires unless the Board, in its discretion, terminates or
commutes the punishment or pardons the offender."). Under
section 77-27-9(1)(b) (Supp. 1998), the Board of Pardons and
Parole may release an offender before the minimum term has been
served if mitigating circumstances justify the release.
3

See. Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1 (Supp. 1998).

4

See State v. Cornish, 560 P.2d 1134, 1136 (Utah 1977)
(Continued on next page.)
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mere fact that a statute may operate to impose criminal liability
does not preclude its use as a sentencing factor, so long as its
use in sentencing does not carry a separate or additional
penalty. Like the firearm enhancement statute, the gang
enhancement statute does not impose an additional or separate
penalty upon the judge's finding that the defendant would be
criminally liable under that statute; it simply enhances the •
minimum sentence,
130 The mere fact that the statute requires the judge to
make a certain finding before imposing a sentence does not make
that finding an additional element of the predicate offense. For
instance, in connection with sentencing, a judge is called upon
to weigh aggravating and mitigating factors, and those factors do
not thereby become additional elements of the underlying offense:
In all cases where an indeterminate sentence
is imposed, the judge imposing the sentence
may . . . mail to the [Board of Pardons and
Parole]
any information he may have
regarding the character pf the offender or
any mitigating or aggravating circumstances
connected with the offense for which the
offender has been convicted. '
Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-13(5) (a) (Supp. 1998); see also id. '••
§ 76-3-201(6) (a) (Supp. 1998) ("If a statute under which the
defendant was convicted mandates that one of three stated minimum
terms shall be imposed, the court shall order imposition of the
term of middle severity unless there are circumstances in
aggravation or mitigation of the crime."); id. § 76-3-201(6)(c)
(Supp. 1998) ("In determining whether there are circumstances
that justify imposition of the highest or lowest term, the court
may consider
statements in aggravation or mitigation
submitted by the prosecution or the defendant, and any further
evidence introduced at the sentencing hearing.").
131 Furthermore, in considering the pertinent sentencing
factors, judges sometimes must take into account the defendant's
4

(Footnote continued.)
(explaining that accomplice is one who participates in crime in
such a way that he could be charged with same offense as the
principal defendant); State v. Murphy, 489 P.2d 430, 431 (1971)
(concluding that defendant who drove co-defendant to store that
was robbed, waited in car with engine running, and then drove codefendant to another car one block away after co-defendant had
allegedly killed store owner was "principal") .
13
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mental state. For example, the Utah Code of Judicial
Administration requires judges to "[c]onsider [the following]
aggravating circumstances only if they are not an element of the
offense, . . . 5. Offense was characterized by extreme cruelty
or depravity. . . . 7. Offender's attitude is not conducive to
supervision in a less restrictive setting." Utah Code of
Judicial Admin, app. C, at 1297 (1998); accord id. app. D, at
1368 (authorizing presentence investigator to consider whether
crime was characterized by extreme cruelty or depravity)/ id. at
1371 (same). Thus, weighing the defendant's state of mind is
well within the realm of a sentencing judge's authority.
132 Moreover, acting with "in concert" mental culpability
is not identified as an element of any of the enumerated felonies
in the gang enhancement statute. See Utah Code Ann. § 7 6-3203.1(4). In fact, under the statute, a sentencing judge does
not even inquire into the defendant's mental state until after
the defendant has been duly convicted of an enumerated felony.
133 The United States Supreme Court's decision in McMillan
v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 91 (1986), is instructive. That
case involved a constitutional challenge to a Pennsylvania
sentencing statute, which provides that anyone convicted of
certain enumerated felonies is subject to a mandatory minimum
sentence of five years' imprisonment if the sentencing judge
finds, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant
"visibly possessed a firearm" during the commission of the
offense. McMillan, 477 U.S. at 81. Recognizing that states have
broad authority to define crimes and prescribe penalties, the
Court observed that
the Pennsylvania Legislature has expressly
provided that visible possession of a firearm
is not an element of the crimes enumerated in
the mandatory sentencing statute . . . but
instead is a sentencing factor that comes
into play only after the defendant has been
found guilty of one of those crimes beyond a
reasonable doubt.
Id. at 85-86.
134 In upholding the constitutionality of the Pennsylvania
statute, the McMillan Court reasoned that (1) the enhancement
implied no presumption of guilt, nor was the prosecution relieved
of its burden of proving the defendant guilty of an enumerated
offense, see id. at 87/ (2) the enhancement did not extend the
period of incarceration beyond the terms provided for any of the
enumerated felonies to which it applied, nor did it create a
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separate offense calling for a separate penalty, but rather
merely limited the trial court's sentencing discretion in
selecting a penalty within the range already available to it, see
id. at 87-88; (3) "[t]he statute [gave] no impression of having
been tailored to permit the visible possession finding to be a
tail which wags the dog of the substantive offense," i.e., the
argument that the enhancement was really an element of the
offense lacked even superficial appeal because it did not expose
the defendant to greater or additional punishment, see id. at 88;
and (4) the Pennsylvania legislature "did not change the
definition of any existing offense [but] simply took one factor
that has always been considered by sentencing courts to bear on
punishment—the instrumentality used in committing a violent
felony—and dictated the precise weight to be given that factor,
id. at 89-90."
In conclusion, the Court stated:
Sentencing courts have traditionally heard
evidence and found facts without any
prescribed burden of proof at all.

Sentencing courts necessarily consider
the circumstances of an offense in selecting
the appropriate punishment, and we have
consistently approved sentencing schemes that
mandate consideration of facts related to the
crime without suggesting that those facts
must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
Id. at 91-92 (citations omitted).
135 Under McMillan's reasoning, the gang enhancement
statute at hand is clearly constitutional. First, the Utah
Legislature expressly chose to make group criminal activity a
sentencing factor rather than a separate offense. See Utah Code
Ann. § 76-3-203.1 (5) (a) ("This section does not create any
separate offense but provides an enhanced penalty for the primary
offense."). This is clear not only from the language of the
statute, but also because the statute does not impose an
additional, separate penalty to the penalty for the underlying
offense. Second, the statute comes into play only after the
defendant has been duly convicted of violating one of the
enumerated offenses in section 76-3-203.1(4). The statute
implies no presumption of guilt, and the prosecution is not
relieved of its burden of proving each element of an enumerated
felony. Third, the statute does not expose the defendant to a
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greater maximum term; it merely increases the minimum sentence
prescribed by statute for the underlying offense. Thus, the
statute in no way operates as "a tail which wags the dog of the
substantive offense." McMillan/ 477 U.S. at 88. Fourth, even if
the commission of an offense "in concert with two or more
persons" has not traditionally been a sentencing factor, that
fact alone should not limit the legislature's authority to
prescribe an enhanced penalty for such conduct. If the
legislature has the authority to determine that committing a
crime while visibly possessing a firearm is a factor that should
be given precise weight during sentencing, it should also have
the authority to determine that committing a crime "in concert
with two or more persons" justifies imposition of an enhanced
minimum sentence if certain requirements are met.5
53 6 Finally, I disagree with the majority's description of
the claimed constitutional right allegedly impinged upon by the
gang enhancement statute. The majority contends that because the
statute enhances the minimum sentence on the basis of findings
concerning the defendant's mental culpability, those findings
somehow become additional elements of a separate crime. As
already indicated, I disagree with this premise. More
disturbing, however, is that from this, the majority extrapolates
that under both the state and the federal due process clauses,
the statute violates a criminal defendant's fundamental right to
be presumed innocent until each element of the offense is proven
beyond a reasonable doubt. While criminal defendants certainly
have a right to such a presumption of innocence, the majority
identifies no authority that this right is infringed when a
sentencing judge makes findings relevant to sentencing without
the state having to prove those findings beyond a reasonable
doubt. Without any articulated constitutional basis, the
majority simply states that this is required.
537 In sum, because the gang, enhancement statute creates
neither a separate crime with a separate penalty nor an

5

While Lopes does not question the reasoning upholding the
Pennsylvania statute in McMillan, he asks this court to
invalidate the gang enhancement statute, which actually makes it
more difficult for a judge to enhance a defendant's sentence.
Under the Pennsylvania statute, the sentencing judge was merely
required to make a factual finding that the defendant visibly
possessed a firearm. Under the gang enhancement statute, the
sentencing judge must make a factual finding and must further
determine that the defendant possessed the mental state required
for liability as an accomplice to the underlying offense. See
Utah Code Ann. § 7 6-2-202.
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additional element to an underlying offense, I would hold that
Lopes was not denied any fundamental rights. I would affirm.

138 Chief Justice Howe concurs in Justice Russon's
dissenting opinion.
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